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poniedziałek, 28 listopada 2011

utajniony raport o badaniach jądrowych Iranu *część pierwsza*

GOV/2003/40, para. 6. Iran stopped implementing the modified Code 3.1 in March 2007 (GOV/2007/22, para.12).

Board of Governors

GOV/2011/65

Date: 8 November 2011

Restricted Distribution

Original: English

For official use only

Item 5(c) of the provisional agenda

(GOV/2011/63)

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards

Agreement and relevant provisions of

Security Council resolutions in the

Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security

Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreementand relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).

2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its

resolutionsare binding on Iran.The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council

resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, in

accordance with the terms of those resolutions.4

__________________________________________________________________________________

The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

The Board of Governors has adopted ten resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran: GOV/2003/69

(12 September 2003); GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003); GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004); GOV/2004/49 (18 June 2004);

GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004); GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004); GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005); GOV/2005/77

(24 September 2005); GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006); and GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009).

In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council: affirmed, inter alia, that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required

by the Board in GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82; reaffirmed Iran’s obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all

outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear

programme; decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards Agreement,

including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; and called upon Iran to act strictly in

accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol and to ratify it promptly (operative paras 1–6).

The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007);

1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).

Atoms for Peace

GOV/2011/65

Page 2

3. By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations,the Agency is required to

cooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance or

restoration of international peace and security. All Members of the United Nations agree to accept and

carry out the decisions of the Security Council,and in this respect, to take actions which are consistent

with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

4. In a letter dated 26 May 2011, H.E. Dr Fereydoun Abbasi, Vice President of Iran and Head of the

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), informed the Director General that Iran would be prepared

to receive relevant questions from the Agency on its nuclear activities after a declaration by the Agency

that the work plan (INFCIRC/711) had been fully implemented and that the Agency would thereafter

implement safeguards in Iran in a routine manner. In his reply of 3 June 2011, the Director General

informed Dr Abbasi that the Agency was neither in a position to make such a declaration, nor to conduct

safeguards in Iran in a routine manner, in light of concerns about the existence in Iran of possible military

dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. On 19 September 2011, the Director General met Dr Abbasi in

Vienna, and discussed issues related to the implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and other

relevant obligations. In a letter dated 30 September 2011, the Agency reiterated its invitation to Iran to reengage

with the Agency on the outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear

programme and the actions required of Iran to resolve those issues. In a letter dated 30 October 2011,

Dr Abbasi referred to his previous discussions with the Director General and expressed the will of Iran “to

remove ambiguities, if any”, suggesting that the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG),

should visit Iran for discussions. In his reply, dated 2 November 2011, the Director General indicated his

preparedness to send the DDG-SG to “discuss the issues identified” in his forthcoming report to the Board

of Governors.

5. This report addresses developments since the last report (GOV/2011/54, 2 September 2011), as well

as issues of longer standing, and, in line with the Director General’s opening remarks to the Board of

Governors on 12 September 2011, contains an Annex setting out in more detail the basis for the Agency’s

concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. The report focuses on those

areas where Iran has not fully implemented its binding obligations, as the full implementation of these

obligations is needed to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s

nuclear programme.

B. Facilities Declared under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement

6. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 15 nuclear facilities and nine

locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).7Notwithstanding that

certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant

resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues

to implement safeguards at these facilities and LOFs.

__________________________________________________________________________________

The Agreement Governing the Relationship between the United Nations and the IAEA entered into force on 14 November 1957,

following approval by the General Conference, upon recommendation of the Board of Governors, and approval by the General

Assembly of the United Nations. It is reproduced in INFCIRC/11 (30 October 1959), Part I.A.

The Charter of the United Nations, Article 25.

All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.

GOV/2011/65

Page 3

C. Enrichment Related Activities

7. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not

suspended its enrichment related activities in the following declared facilities, all of which are

nevertheless under Agency safeguards.

C.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant

8. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP): There are two cascade halls at FEP: Production Hall A and

Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, eight units are planned for

Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit. No detailed design information has yet been provided

for Production Hall B.

9. As of 2 November 2011, 54 cascades were installed in three of the eight units in Production Hall A,

37 of which were declared by Iran as being fed with UF6.Whereas initially each installed cascade

comprised 164 centrifuges, Iran has subsequently modified 15 of the cascades to contain 174 centrifuges

each. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. As of 2 November 2011, installation work in

the remaining five units was ongoing, but no centrifuges had been installed, and there had been no

installation work in Production Hall B.

10. Between 15 October and 8 November 2011, the Agency conducted a physical inventory verification

(PIV) at FEP, the results of which the Agency is currently evaluating.

11. Iran has estimated that, between 18 October 2010 and 1 November 2011, it produced 1787 kg of low

enriched UF6, which would result in a total production of 4922 kg of low enriched UFsince production

began in February 2007.The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all

installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and

surveillance.10 The consequences for safeguards of the seal breakage in the feed and withdrawal area11 will

be evaluated by the Agency upon completion of its assessment of the PIV.

12. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 200712

and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by

Iran in the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ).

13. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP): PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a

pilot low enriched uranium (LEU) production facility, which was first brought into operation in

October 2003. It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area

designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area

designated for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).

14. In the production area, Iran first began feeding low enriched UFinto Cascade 1 on 9 February 2010,

for the stated purpose of producing UFenriched up to 20% U-235 for use in the manufacture of fuel for

__________________________________________________________________________________

The 54 installed cascades contained approximately 8000 centrifuges; the 37 cascades declared by Iran as being fed with UFon

that date contained 6208 centrifuges. Not all of the centrifuges in the cascades that were being fed with UFmay have been

working.

The Agency previously verified that, as of 17 October 2010, a total of 3135 kg of low enriched UFhad been produced since the

start of operations in February 2007 (GOV/2011/29, para. 9).

10 In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are not

subject to containment and surveillance.

11 GOV/2011/29, para. 10.

12 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 6 March 2011.

GOV/2011/65

Page 4

the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).13,14 Since 13 July 2010, Iran has been feeding low enriched UFinto

two interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6), each of which consists of 164 IR-1 centrifuges.15

15. Between 13 and 29 September 2011, the Agency conducted a PIV at PFEP and verified that, as of

13 September 2011, 720.8 kg of low enriched UFhad been fed into the cascade(s) in the production area

since the process began on 9 February 2010, and that a total of 73.7 kg of UFenriched up to 20% U-235

had been produced. The Agency is continuing with its assessment of the results of the PIV. Iran has

estimated that, between 14 September 2011 and 28 October 2011, a total of 44.7 kg of UF6enriched at

FEP was fed into the two interconnected cascades and that approximately 6 kg of UF6enriched up to 20%

U-235 were produced.

16. The preliminary results of the PIV show an improvement to the operator’s weighing system. Once

the assessment of the PIV has been completed, the Agency will be able to determine whether the

operator’s better sampling procedures have resulted in a more accurate determination of the level of U-235

enrichment.16

17. In the R&D area, as of 22 October 2011, Iran had installed 164 IR-2m centrifuges in Cascade 5,17 all

of which were under vacuum, and 66 IR-4 centrifuges in Cascade 4, none of which had been fed with UF6.

In Cascades 2 and 3, Iran has been feeding natural UFinto single machines, 10-machine cascades and

20-machine cascades of IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges.

18. Between 21 August 2011 and 28 October 2011, a total of approximately 59.8 kg of natural UFwas

fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails are

recombined at the end of the process.

19. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP18 and other

verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the

DIQ.

.

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