Content-Monitor-Islam

Wpis

poniedziałek, 28 listopada 2011

utajniony raport o badaniach jądrowych Iranu *część druga*

aras 13 and 15

C.2. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant

20. In September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it was constructing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment

Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom. In its DIQ of 10 October 2009, Iran stated that the purpose of

the facility was the production of UFenriched up to 5% U-235, and that the facility was being built to

contain 16 cascades, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges.19

21. In September 2010, Iran provided the Agency with a revised DIQ in which it stated that the purpose

of FFEP was to include R&D as well as the production of UFenriched up to 5% U-235.

22. As previously reported, Iran provided the Agency with another revised DIQ in June 2011 in which

the stated purpose of FFEP was the production of UFenriched up to 20% U-235, as well as R&D. Iran

informed the Agency that initially this production would take place within two sets of two interconnected

cascades, and that each of these cascades would consist of 174 centrifuges. Iran was reported to have

__________________________________________________________________________________

13 GOV/2010/28, para. 9.

14 TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets

and for research and training purposes.

15 GOV/2010/28, para. 9.

16 GOV/2011/29, para. 14; GOV/2011/54, para. 15.

17 Iran had previously indicated its intention to install two 164-centrifuge cascades (Cascades 4 and 5) in the R&D area

(GOV/2011/7, para. 17).

18 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 5 March 2011.

19 GOV/2009/74, para. 9.

GOV/2011/65

Page 5

decided to “triple its (production) capacity”, after which Iran would stop the “20% fuel production” at

Natanz.20

23. On 17 October 2011, as anticipated in its letter to the Agency dated 11 October 2011, Iran transferred

from FEP to FFEP one large cylinder containing LEU in the form of UFand one small cylinder

containing depleted uranium (DU) in the form of UF6. According to Iran, the LEU will be used for feeding

and the DU will be used for line passivation. On 24 October 2011, the Agency detached the seal on the

cylinder containing the DU, and the cylinder was immobilized at the feeding station. At the request of

Iran, the Agency will detach the seal on the cylinder containing the LEU on 8 November 2011, and the

cylinder will be immobilized at the feeding station.

24. During an inspection on 23 and 24 October 2011, the Agency verified that Iran had installed all 174

centrifuges in each of two cascades, neither of which had been connected to the cooling and electrical

lines, and had installed 64 centrifuges in a third cascade. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1

machines. Iran informed the Agency that the main power supply had been connected to the facility. No

centrifuges had been installed in the area designated for R&D purposes.

25. The Agency continues to verify that FFEP is being constructed according to the latest DIQ provided

by Iran. As previously reported, although Iran has provided some clarification regarding the initial timing

of, and circumstances relating to, its decision to build FFEP at an existing defence establishment,

additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this facility.21

26. The results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at FFEP up to 27 April 2011 did not

indicate the presence of enriched uranium.22

C.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities

27. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further

information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium

enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided, and the construction

of one of which was to have begun by the end of the last Iranian year (20 March 2011) or the start of this

Iranian year.23,24 In August 2011, Dr Abbasi was reported as having said that Iran did not need to build

new enrichment facilities during the next two years.25 Iran has not provided information, as requested by

the Agency in its letter of 18 August 2010, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it

possessed laser enrichment technology.26 As a result of Iran’s lack of cooperation on those issues, the

Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.

__________________________________________________________________________________

20 Dr Fereydoun Abbasi, ‘Iran to Triple Production of 20%-Enriched Uranium’, Fars News Agency, 8 June 2011.

21 GOV/2011/29, para. 20.

22 The results did show a small number of particles of depleted uranium (GOV/2010/10, para. 17).

23 ‘Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites’, Fars News Agency, 16 August 2010.

24 GOV/2010/46, para. 33.

25 ‘Iran atomic chief says fuel swap talks over: IRNA’, Agence France Press article of 31 August 2011, citing remarks made by

Dr Abbasi during an interview with the Islamic Republic News Agency.

26 Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at

http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255 .

GOV/2011/65

Page 6

D. Reprocessing Activities

28. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is

obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.27 In a letter to the Agency dated

15 February 2008, Iran stated that it “does not have reprocessing activities”. In that context, the Agency

has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at TRR and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon

Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.28 The Agency carried out an inspection and design information

verification (DIV) at TRR on 15 October 2011, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 16 October 2011. It is

only with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that the

Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.

E. Heavy Water Related Projects

29. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not

suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water

moderated research reactor, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor), which is subject to

Agency safeguards.29

30. On 17 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed that

construction of the facility was ongoing and the coolant heat exchangers had been installed. According to

Iran, the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is planned to commence by the end of 2013.

31. Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency, in a

letter to Iran dated 20 October 2011, requested further access to HWPP. The Agency has yet to receive a

reply to that letter, and is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on

recent images, the HWPP appears to be in operation. To date, Iran has not provided the Agency access to

the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in order to take samples.30

F. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

32. Although it is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects,

Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF and the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan

which, as described below, are in contravention of those obligations, although both facilities are under

Agency safeguards.

33. Uranium Conversion Facility: On 18 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF during

which the Agency observed the ongoing installation of the process equipment for the conversion of UF6

enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8. During the DIV, Iran informed the Agency that the initial tests of

__________________________________________________________________________________

27 S/RES/1696 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1;

S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

28 The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium,

irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.

29 S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4;

S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

30 GOV/2010/10, paras 20 and 21.

GOV/2011/65

Page 7

this conversion line, originally scheduled to start on 6 September 2011, had been postponed and would not

involve the use of nuclear material.

34. As previously reported, Iran informed the Agency in July 2011 that it would start R&D activities at

UCF for the conversion of UFenriched up to 5% U-235 into UO2. During the aforementioned DIV, Iran

informed the Agency that 6.8 kg of DU in the form of UFhad been processed and that Iran had produced

113 g of uranium in the form of UOthat met its specifications. According to Iran, this UO2has been sent

to FMP to produce test pellets. Iran has also started using UFenriched to 3.34% U-235 to produce UO2.

During the DIV, Iran further informed the Agency that this UOwould also be sent to FMP to produce

fuel pellets, which would then be sent to TRR for “performance test studies”.

35. In a letter dated 4 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency of the postponement of the production of

natural UF6, involving the use of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium

Production Plant, originally scheduled to restart on 23 October 2011. In a letter dated 11 October 2011,

Iran informed the Agency that, from 11 November 2011, it intended to use UOC produced at the Bandar

Abbas Uranium Production Plant for the production of natural uranium in the form of UO2. During the

DIV on 18 October 2011, the Agency took a sample of this UOC. During the same DIV, Iran informed the

Agency that, since 23 July 2011, it had fed into the process 958.7 kg of uranium in the form of UOC31 and

produced about 185.6 kg of natural uranium in the form of UO2, and further indicated that some of the

product had been fed back into the process. In a letter dated 8 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency

that it had transferred about 1 kg of this UOto the R&D section of FMP in order to “conduct research

activities and pellet fabrication”.

Szczegóły wpisu

Tagi:
Autor(ka):
arab-21
Czas publikacji:
poniedziałek, 28 listopada 2011 04:08

Polecane wpisy