poniedziałek, 28 listopada 2011

Utajniony raport o badaniach jądrowych Iranu *część trzecia*

that the reactor has since been shut down for routine maintenance.

36. Fuel Manufacturing Plant: As previously reported, in a DIQ for FMP dated 31 May 2011, Iran

informed the Agency that a fresh fuel rod of natural UO2 manufactured at FMP would be shipped to TRR

for irradiation and post-irradiation analysis. On 15 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and

a DIV at TRR and confirmed that, on 23 August 2011, Iran had started to irradiate a prototype fuel rod

containing natural UO2 that had been manufactured at FMP. In a letter dated 30 August 2011, Iran

informed the Agency that “for the time being” it had no plans to conduct any destructive testing on the rod

and that only non-destructive testing would be conducted at TRR.

37. On 22 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FMP and confirmed that Iran

had started to install some equipment for the fabrication of fuel for TRR.32 During the inspection, the

Agency verified five fuel plates containing natural U3O8 that had been produced at the R&D laboratory at

FMP for testing purposes.

G. Possible Military Dimensions

38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible

military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.33 Since

2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed

nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the

development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new



31 This was taken from Iran’s stockpile of imported UOC (GOV/2003/75, Annex I, para. 8).

32 GOV/2010/46, para. 26.

33 GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras 40–45; GOV/2009/55, paras 18–25; GOV/2008/38,

paras 14–21; GOV/2008/15, paras 14–25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras 35–42.


Page 8

39. The Board of Governors has called on Iran on a number of occasions to engage with the Agency on

the resolution of all outstanding issues in order to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to

Iran’s nuclear programme.34 In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran’s obligations

to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82,

and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to

concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, including by providing

access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.35 Since

August 2008, Iran has not engaged with the Agency in any substantive way on this matter.

40. The Director General, in his opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011,

stated that in the near future he hoped to set out in greater detail the basis for the Agency's concerns so that

all Member States would be kept fully informed. In line with that statement, the Annex to this report

provides a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency to date which has given rise to

concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

41. The analysis itself is based on a structured and systematic approach to information analysis which the

Agency uses in its evaluation of safeguards implementation in all States with comprehensive safeguards

agreements in force. This approach involves, inter alia, the identification of indicators of the existence or

development of the processes associated with nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.

42. The information which serves as the basis for the Agency’s analysis and concerns, as identified in the

Annex, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information comes from a wide variety of

independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency’s own efforts and from

information provided by Iran itself. It is consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and

organizations involved, and time frames.

43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the

development of a nuclear explosive device:

? Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by

military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);

? Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex,

Section C.3);

? The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a

clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and

? Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of

components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).

44. While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications,

others are specific to nuclear weapons.

45. The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a

structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a

nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.


34 Most recently in GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009).

35 S/RES/1929, paras 2 and 3.


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H. Design Information

46. The modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement

provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision

to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The

modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed

early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains

the only State with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive

safeguards agreement but which is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1.36 The

Agency is still awaiting receipt from Iran of updated design information for the IR-40 Reactor, and further

information pursuant to statements it has made concerning the planned construction of new uranium

enrichment facilities and the design of a reactor similar to TRR.37

47. As reported previously, Iran’s response to Agency requests for Iran to confirm or provide further

information regarding its statements concerning its intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it

would provide the Agency with the required information in “due time” rather than as required by the

modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.38

I. Additional Protocol

48. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not

implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance

about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the

necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.39

J. Other Matters

49. In August 2011, the Agency carried out a PIV at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research

Laboratory (JHL) to verify, inter alia, nuclear material, in the form of natural uranium metal and process

waste, related to the conversion experiments carried out by Iran between 1995 and 2002.40,41 The Agency’s

measurement of this material was 19.8 kg less than the operator’s declaration of 270.7 kg. In a letter dated


36 In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally;

nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

Therefore, as previously explained in the Director General’s reports (see e.g. GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007), the modified

Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative paragraph 5 of Security Council

resolution 1929 (2010) to “comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the

application of modified Code 3.1”.

37 GOV/2010/46, para. 32.

38 See para. 27 of this report and GOV/2011/29, para. 37.

39 Iran’s Additional Protocol was approved by the Board on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003,

although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and

February 2006.

40 This material had been under Agency seal since 2003.

41 GOV/2003/75, paras 20–25 and Annex 1; GOV/2004/34, para. 32, and Annex, paras 10–12; GOV/2004/60, para. 33, and

Annex, paras 1–7.


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2 November 2011, Iran provided additional information on this matter. The Agency is working with Iran

to try to resolve this discrepancy.

50. As previously reported, in a letter dated 19 June 2011, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to

“transfer some of spent fuel assemblies (HEU [high enriched uranium] Control Fuel Element (CFE) and

Standard Fuel Element (SFE)) from spent fuel pool (KMPE) to reactor core (KMPB) in order to conduct a

research project”. As of 15 October 2011, this activity had yet to begin.

51. On 2 and 3 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant,

during which the Agency noted that the reactor was in operation. Iran subsequently informed the Agency

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