poniedziałek, 28 listopada 2011

Utajniony raport o badaniach jądrowych Iranu *część ostatnia*

K. Summary

52. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear

facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the

necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to

provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and

therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.42

53. The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear

programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency

finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities

relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the

end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be


54. Given the concerns identified above, Iran is requested to engage substantively with the Agency

without delay for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s

nuclear programme as identified in the Annex to this report.

55. The Agency is working with Iran with a view to resolving the discrepancy identified during the

recent PIV at JHL.

56. The Director General urges Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and

mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards

Agreement and its other obligations, including: implementation of the provisions of its Additional

Protocol; implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its

Safeguards Agreement; suspension of enrichment related activities; suspension of heavy water related

activities; and, as referred to above, addressing the Agency’s serious concerns about possible military

dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively

peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

57. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.


42 The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which

corresponds to Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the nondiversion

of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State

(i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49).



Page 1


Possible Military Dimensions to Iran’s Nuclear Programme

1. This Annex consists of three Sections: Section A, which provides an historical overview of the

Agency’s efforts to resolve questions about the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, in

particular regarding concerns about possible military dimensions; Section B, which provides a general

description of the sources of information available to the Agency and its assessment of the credibility of

that information; and Section C, which reflects the Agency’s analysis of the information available to it in

the context of relevant indicators of the existence or development of processes associated with

nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.

A. Historical Overview

2. Since late 2002, the Director General has reported to the Board of Governors on the Agency’s

concerns about the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Such concerns coincided with the appearance in

open sources of information which indicated that Iran was building a large underground nuclear related

facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak.1

3. Between 2003 and 2004, the Agency confirmed a number of significant failures on the part of Iran

to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material,

the processing and use of undeclared nuclear material and the failure to declare facilities where the nuclear

material had been received, stored and processed.2 Specifically, it was discovered that, as early as the late

1970s and early 1980s, and continuing into the 1990s and 2000s, Iran had used undeclared nuclear

material for testing and experimentation in several uranium conversion, enrichment, fabrication and

irradiation activities, including the separation of plutonium, at undeclared locations and facilities.3

4. In October 2003, Iran informed the Director General that it had adopted a policy of full disclosure

and had decided to provide the Agency with a full picture of its nuclear activities.4 Following that

announcement, Iran granted the Agency access to locations the Agency requested to visit, provided

information and clarifications in relation to the origin of imported equipment and components and made

individuals available for interviews. It also continued to implement the modified Code 3.1 of the

Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, to which it agreed in February 2003, which provides for the

submission of design information on new nuclear facilities as soon as the decision to construct or to

authorize construction of such a facility is taken.5 In November 2003, Iran announced its intention to sign

an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement (which it did in December 2003 following Board

approval of the text), and that, prior to its entry into force, Iran would act in accordance with the

provisions of that Protocol.6

5. Between 2003 and early 2006, Iran submitted inventory change reports, provided design

information with respect to facilities where the undeclared activities had taken place and made nuclear


1 GOV/2003/40, para. 3.

2 GOV/2003/40, para. 32; GOV/2003/75, para. 48; GOV/2004/83, paras 85–86; GOV/2005/67, para. 4.

3 GOV/2003/75, Annex 1; GOV/2004/83, paras 85–86.

4 GOV/2003/75, paras 13 and 15.

5 GOV/2003/40, para. 6. Iran stopped implementing the modified Code 3.1 in March 2007 (GOV/2007/22, para. 12).

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